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ARIZONA FREE ENTERPRISE CLUB’S FREEDOM 
CLUB PAC V. BENNETT: TAKING THE 
GOVERNMENT’S FINGER OFF THE CAMPAIGN 
FINANCE TRIGGER 
Robert Steele* 
INTRODUCTION 
Running as a political outsider, health care executive Rick Scott1 
found himself engaged in a heated primary race for Governor of 
Florida during the summer of 2010.2 His opponent in the primary was 
Bill McCollum, the state attorney general and a prominent figure in 
Florida politics for more than twenty years.3 Whereas Scott chose to 
privately finance his campaign, McCollum elected to take part in 
Florida’s system of public campaign financing.4 As June turned to 
July, campaigning took on a great deal of importance in light of 
Florida’s August primary election. However, this was precisely when 
Scott drastically reduced spending on his campaign.5 In fact, Scott 
                                                                                                                 
*J.D. Candidate, 2012, Georgia State University College of Law; Research Editor, Georgia State 
University Law Review; B.S.B.A. Finance, 2003, University of Central Florida. Thanks to Professor 
Lynn Hogue and the Georgia State University Law Review editors and members for their insight and 
suggestions, and to my father, Ted Steele, for being the role model that every son should have. 
 1. Scott v. Roberts, 612 F.3d 1279, 1282 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Scott’s description of himself as 
a “health care executive and businessman” and a “conservative outsider”). Rick Scott later won the 
election for Governor of Florida. Aaron Deslatte et al., GOP Upstart Wins Governor’s Race, ORLANDO 
SENTINEL, Nov. 4, 2010, at A1, available at 2010 WLNR 22051029. 
 2. See, e.g., Aaron Deslatte, Is GOP Ad War Backfiring?, ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 22, 2010, at 
B1, available at 2010 WLNR 14604500; William March, McCollum Slips, Goes on Attack, TAMPA 
TRIB., June 23, 2010, at 1, available at 2010 WLNR 15696243. 
 3. Scott, 612 F.3d at 1282 (“Before the voters . . . elected [him] attorney general in 2006, 
McCollum had served for nearly 20 years as a Member of Congress from Florida. McCollum had also 
twice campaigned . . . for United States Senator from Florida.”). 
 4. Id. Public campaign financing refers to a voluntary system where candidates receive campaign 
funds from the public treasury in exchange for agreeing to limit expenditures (i.e. money spent by 
candidates) and meeting other conditions. See Richard Briffault, Public Funding and Democratic 
Elections, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 563, 566–68 (1999). Public funding exists in states and cities across the 
country, as well as at the federal level. Id. 
 5. See Scott, 612 F.3d at 1283. 
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cut the time purchased for television advertisements by about half 
from June 25 to July 2 and limited the market saturation of those 
advertisements.6 Scott then halted all television and radio 
advertisements from July 3 to July 6.7 
The explanation for this seemingly counterintuitive behavior lies in 
a “trigger provision”8 that was part of Florida’s public campaign 
financing system.9 This trigger provision granted a publicly funded 
candidate a dollar-for-dollar subsidy for every dollar that a privately 
funded, nonparticipating candidate spent over a statutorily defined 
expenditure limit.10 The expenditure limit for the 2010 election cycle 
was approximately $25 million.11 As Scott approached the $25 
million threshold that would trigger the provision, he sued the state of 
Florida12 and asked for a preliminary injunction to block public funds 
from being released to his opponents.13 Scott argued that the trigger 
provision violated his right to free speech under the First and 
                                                                                                                 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. Scott also alleged that he cut the television time he purchased for advertisements by 40% 
from July 7 to July 13. Id. 
 8. These provisions, which attach adverse consequences for exceeding threshold expenditure 
amounts, are referred to in many different ways in the campaign finance lexicon. See Ariz. Free Enter. 
Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2813 (2011) (referring to an Arizona campaign 
finance law that granted funds to candidates based on their opponents’ expenditures as a “matching 
funds” scheme); Scott, 612 F.3d at 1281 (referring to a Florida campaign finance provision triggered by 
expenditures as an “excess spending subsidy”); Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield, 616 F.3d 213, 218 (2d 
Cir. 2010), cert. denied sub nom. Green Party of Conn. v. Lenge, 131 S. Ct. 3090 (2011) (mem.) 
(referring to a Connecticut campaign finance provision that provided a subsidy to participating 
candidates for excess expenditures by their opponents as a “trigger provision”); N.C. Right to Life 
Comm. Fund for Indep. Political Expenditures v. Leake, 524 F.3d 427, 433 n.2 (4th Cir. 2008) (stating 
that a recent amendment to a North Carolina statute containing a trigger provision replaced the term 
“matching funds” with “rescue funds”). For consistency and to avoid confusion, “trigger provision” will 
be used throughout this Comment to refer to a provision that is triggered, in whole or in part, by 
campaign expenditures. 
 9. Florida Election Campaign Financing Act, FLA. STAT. §§ 106.30–.36 (2010). 
 10. Id. § 106.355. The maximum subsidy that could be paid to a participating candidate was twice 
the amount of the expenditure limit. Id. 
 11. The expenditure limit was calculated by multiplying $2 by the number of registered voters in 
Florida. Id. § 106.34(1)(a). For 2010, the exact limit was $24,901,170. Scott, 612 F.3d at 1283. 
 12. Scott, 612 F.3d at 1281–82. 
 13. In addition to Scott and McCollum, Mike McCallister was also running for the Republican 
gubernatorial nomination in 2010. Id. at 1282. McCallister, however, was described as a “nominal 
candidate.” Id. 
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Fourteenth Amendments14 because it forced him to curtail his 
campaign expenditures in order to give his opponents a “competitive 
advantage and in turn permit[] them to counteract and diminish [his] 
campaign speech.”15 After the lawsuit was filed, the McCollum 
campaign released a statement saying: “Now that [Rick Scott] is 
failing to win over voters, despite the millions he is personally 
hemorrhaging into his campaign . . . he wants to change the rules of 
the game.”16 In response, Scott’s campaign shot back: “Only a career 
politician like Bill McCollum would employ a risky strategy to spend 
all his money and then demand that taxpayers bail him out when his 
failing campaign is broke and needs more money . . . .”17 
A serious legal question lurks behind this political rhetoric: Are 
trigger provisions in campaign finance laws violative of a privately 
funded candidate’s First Amendment right to free speech? In Arizona 
Free Enterprise Club’s Free Enterprise PAC v. Bennett, the United 
States Supreme Court analyzed a similar trigger provision in an 
Arizona campaign finance law and answered this question in the 
affirmative.18 In addition to curing a jurisdictional split that had 
developed around trigger provisions, the Court’s holding will also 
have ramifications that reach many current and future campaign 
finance laws. 
Part I of this Comment begins with Buckley v. Valeo,19 the case 
that established the Supreme Court’s framework for First 
Amendment challenges to campaign finance laws.20 Next, Part I 
reviews the challenges to trigger provisions heard by federal courts 
                                                                                                                 
 14. The First Amendment states, in part, “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, extends this bar on the abridgement of free speech to the states. E.g., First 
Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 779–80 (1978). For consistency, all further discussion in 
this Comment will reference the First Amendment only. 
 15. Scott, 612 F.3d at 1281, 1284. 
 16. Kevin Derby, Low on Cash, Bill McCollum Battles Rick Scott’s Challenge to Campaign Finance 
Law, SUNSHINE ST. NEWS (July 13, 2010, 4:05 AM), http://www.sunshinestatenews.com/story/low-
cash-bill-mccollum-battles-rick-scotts-challenge-campaign-finance-law. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011). 
 19. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). 
 20. See discussion infra Part I.A. 
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before Davis v. FEC,21 which was the first decision by the Supreme 
Court to directly address the provisions.22 Part I concludes with a 
discussion of Davis and of the post-Davis circuit split.23 Part II 
analyzes the majority and dissenting opinions of the Supreme Court 
in the Arizona Free Enterprise case that cured the circuit split by 
finding trigger provisions unconstitutional.24 Finally, Part III suggests 
alternative ways that states can implement effective campaign 
finance regulations without using trigger provisions.25 
I. CHALLENGES TO CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS: FROM FECA TO 
TRIGGER PROVISIONS 
A. Buckley v. Valeo and the Supreme Court’s Campaign Finance 
Framework 
The seminal decision in the Supreme Court’s campaign finance 
jurisprudence came in Buckley v. Valeo.26 Decided in 1976, Buckley 
dealt with several constitutional challenges27 to the Federal Election 
Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA),28 as amended in 1974.29 In addition 
to placing limits on the size of certain political contributions and 
limiting expenditures for candidates running for federal office, FECA 
                                                                                                                 
 21. Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724 (2008). 
 22. See discussion infra Part I.B. 
 23. See discussion infra Part I.C–D. 
 24. See discussion infra Part II. 
 25. See discussion infra Part III. 
 26. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). The Buckley decision established the 
framework for all campaign finance challenges to follow. See Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club 
PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2830 (2011) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“As we recognized in Buckley v. 
Valeo, our seminal campaign finance case . . . .” (citation omitted)); Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. 
Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1706 (1999) (“Most of the 
legal-academic debate about campaign finance begins with Buckley and its progeny . . . .”); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Political Equality and Unintended Consequences, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1390, 1394 (1994) (“By 
far the most important campaign finance case is of course Buckley v. Valeo . . . .”). 
 27. The plaintiffs included a candidate for President of the United States, a United States Senator 
who was running for re-election, and several political parties and funds. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 7–8. 
 28. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (codified as amended at 
2 U.S.C. §§ 431–441h, 451–455, and in scattered sections of 18 & 47 U.S.C.). 
 29. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 2, 18, 26 & 47 U.S.C.). 
4
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 5
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol28/iss2/5
2012] CAMPAIGN FINANCE 471 
included provisions that established disclosure requirements for 
political contributions and expenditures, developed a public funding 
system for presidential campaign activities, and created the Federal 
Election Commission (FEC).30 For the impact of the Buckley decision 
on trigger provisions, it is necessary to focus mainly on the Court’s 
handling of the contribution and expenditure limits established by 
FECA.31 
In Buckley, the Court made a clear distinction between 
contribution limits and expenditure limits.32 While finding the 
contribution limits in FECA to be constitutional, the Court 
invalidated the expenditure limits.33 In its discussion on contribution 
limits, the Court recognized that FECA presented First Amendment 
concerns,34 but examined whether the government’s means were 
“closely drawn” to a “sufficiently important interest.”35 Using this 
phrasing, the Court examined contribution limits under what has 
come to be known as “Buckley scrutiny.”36 This standard is less 
                                                                                                                 
 30. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 7. At close to 300 pages long, “Buckley is a lengthy and complex 
decision addressing multiple statutory provisions. The judgment of the Court was expressed in a per 
curiam opinion, parts of which were joined by different groups of Justices.” Richard M. Esenberg, The 
Lonely Death of Public Campaign Financing, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 283, 290 (2010). 
 31. For a thorough analysis of the Buckley decision, see Daniel D. Polsby, Buckley v. Valeo: The 
Special Nature of Political Speech, 1976 SUP. CT. REV. 1. For more recent analyses of campaign finance 
regulation with Buckley as a backdrop, see Esenberg, supra note 30; Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political 
Money and Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 663 (1997). 
 32. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 58–59. 
 33. Id. Although outside the scope of this Comment, there is disagreement with the Court’s decision 
to treat campaign contributions and campaign expenditures differently. Esenberg, supra note 30, at 292–
93 (“Buckley’s distinction between expenditures and contributions has been criticized by opponents and 
advocates of regulation alike. . . . [Among the Justices,] Justice Thomas would leave little room for 
regulation [on expenditures or contributions]. Justice Stevens, on the other hand, believes that 
expenditure limits should be allowed just as limits on contributions.”). 
 34. The Buckley Court framed the First Amendment concerns related to contribution limits in light 
of protected rights of association. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 24 (“[T]he primary First Amendment problem 
raised by the Act’s contribution limitations is their restriction of one aspect of the contributor’s freedom 
of political association.”). However, the Court has since stated that if a contribution limitation survives 
an associational rights challenge, then it will also survive a free speech challenge. See Nixon v. Shrink 
Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 388 (2000) (“[W]e did make it clear that [contribution limits] bore more 
heavily on the associational right than on freedom to speak. We consequently proceeded on the 
understanding that a contribution limitation surviving a claim of associational abridgment would survive 
a speech challenge as well . . . .”) (citation omitted)). 
 35. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25. 
 36. Nathaniel Persily & Kelli Lammie, Perceptions of Corruption and Campaign Finance: When 
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stringent than the more common constitutional standard of “strict 
scrutiny,” which requires the government’s means to be narrowly 
tailored to achieve a compelling state interest.37 The main interest 
advanced in support of the contribution limits—and the only interest 
the Court in Buckley found to be “sufficiently important”—was an 
“anticorruption interest” in trying to prevent the corruption, or the 
appearance of corruption, that accompanies large financial 
contributions to candidates for office.38 Because the Court felt limits 
on campaign contributions to political candidates furthered this 
anticorruption interest and were closely drawn to that end, they were 
found to be constitutional.39 
Conversely, the Supreme Court applied a different level of scrutiny 
when examining the constitutionality of the expenditure limits in 
FECA because expenditure limits “impose[d] direct and substantial 
restraints on the quantity of political speech.”40 Although the Buckley 
Court did not identify the specific test it was using, it has since been 
interpreted as strict scrutiny.41 In this discussion, the Court rejected 
                                                                                                                 
Public Opinion Determines Constitutional Law, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 119, 125–26 (2004) (“Unlike 
restrictions on individual expenditures, which . . . trigger strict scrutiny, contribution restrictions are 
subject to less-than-strict scrutiny (sometimes called ‘Buckley scrutiny’).” (footnote omitted)). 
 37. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010) (“Laws [that burden political speech] are 
‘subject to strict scrutiny,’ which requires the Government to prove that the restriction ‘furthers a 
compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.’” (quoting FEC v. Wis. Right to 
Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007))). Although not always explicit in doing so, the Supreme Court has 
since applied Buckley scrutiny to contribution limits in campaign finance challenges, not strict scrutiny. 
See Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2817 (2011) (“[W]e have 
subjected strictures on campaign-related speech that we have found less onerous to a lower level of 
scrutiny and upheld [the strictures if] closely drawn to serve a sufficiently important interest . . . .” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 134 (2003) (“In Buckley and 
subsequent cases, we have subjected restrictions on campaign expenditures to closer scrutiny than limits 
on campaign contributions.”); cf. Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 737 (2008) (“When contribution limits 
are challenged . . . we have extended a measure of deference to the judgment of the legislative body that 
enacted the law.”). 
 38. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25–29. The Court discussed corruption in terms of the danger to the 
integrity of the political process that results from quid pro quo arrangements, between donors and 
candidates, for improper political commitments. See Id. Of “almost equal concern” to the Court was the 
perception amongst the public that these types of arrangements could be taking place. Id. at 27. 
 39. Id. at 58 (“The contribution ceilings thus serve the basic governmental interest in safeguarding 
the integrity of the electoral process without directly impinging upon the rights of individual citizens 
and candidates to engage in political debate and discussion.”). 
 40. Id. at 39. 
 41. See Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. at 464 (“Because [the provision restricting independent 
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an “equalization rationale” as a compelling interest to justify limiting 
expenditures, stating that attempting to equalize the financial 
resources of candidates was “wholly foreign to the First 
Amendment.”42 As for the anticorruption interest, the Court made 
                                                                                                                 
expenditures] burdens political speech, it is subject to strict scrutiny.” (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44–
45)); see also Ariz. Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2817 (“‘Laws that burden political speech are’ accordingly 
‘subject to strict scrutiny . . . .’” (quoting Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 882)). 
 42. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48–49. Among commentators, there is support for the Supreme Court to 
adopt an equalization rationale as a compelling interest to satisfy strict scrutiny. See Richard L. Hasen, 
Clipping Coupons for Democracy: An Egalitarian/Public Choice Defense of Campaign Finance 
Vouchers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 7 (1996) (discussing the use of a voucher system of campaign finance 
that “minimizes the impact of wealth on the political system and empowers those who currently lack 
political capital”); Sunstein, supra note 26, at 1392 (“Certainly economic equality is not required in a 
democracy; but it is most troublesome if people . . . are allowed to translate their wealth into political 
influence. It is equally troublesome if the electoral process translates poverty into an absence of political 
influence.”); J. Skelly Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment an Obstacle 
to Political Equality?, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 645 (1982) (“The growing impact of concentrated 
wealth on the political process, and the glaring inequalities in political campaign resources, threaten the 
very essence of political equality.”); Grant Fevurly, Case Note, Davis v. Federal Election Commission: 
A Further Step Towards Campaign Finance Deregulation and the Preservation of the Millionaires’ 
Club, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 627, 674 (2010) (“Rather, the competing concern of equality, with the goals 
it fosters . . . should provide a mediating influence to the expenditure of unbridled wealth pursuant to a 
candidate campaign.”). But see Samuel Gedge, “Wholly Foreign to the First Amendment”: The Demise 
of Campaign Finance’s Equalizing Rationale in Davis v. Federal Election Commission, 128 S. Ct. 2759 
(2008), 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1197, 1209 (2009) (“Not only has Davis reasserted Buckley’s long-
neglected declaration that equalizing interests are ‘wholly foreign to the First Amendment,’ it has laid a 
much-needed foundation upon which to construct new constitutional challenges to numerous facets of 
campaign finance regulation.” (footnote omitted) (quoting Davis, 554 U.S. at 742)); David A. Strauss, 
What is the Goal of Campaign Finance Reform?, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 141, 160 (“[T]he distorting 
effects of inequality may be limited. Precluding the private use of wealth will only eliminate a large 
source of voluntary funding, with no offsetting gain.”); Sullivan, supra note 31, at 675 (“[S]hort of 
major revision of general First Amendment understandings, campaign finance reform may not be 
predicated on equality of citizen participation in elections . . . .”). Since Buckley, the Supreme Court has 
rejected the equalization rationale numerous times. Ariz. Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2825 (“We have 
repeatedly rejected the argument that the government has a compelling state interest in ‘leveling the 
playing field’ that can justify undue burdens on political speech.”); Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 904 
(“Buckley rejected the premise that the Government has an interest ‘in equalizing the relative ability of 
individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections.’” (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48)); 
Davis, 554 U.S. at 741–42 (“Our prior decisions . . . provide no support for the proposition that [the 
equalization rationale] is a legitimate government objective. . . . The argument that a candidate’s speech 
may be restricted in order to ‘level electoral opportunities’ has ominous implications because it would 
permit Congress to arrogate the voter’s authority . . . .” (citations omitted)); see also Nixon v. Shrink 
Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 428 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“As we have noted, ‘preventing 
corruption or the appearance of corruption are the only legitimate and compelling government interests 
thus far identified for restricting campaign finances.’” (quoting FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political 
Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 496–97 (1985))); Scott v. Roberts, 612 F.3d 1279, 1292 (11th Cir. 2010) 
(“[The state] argue[s] that the [trigger provision] furthers the interest of the state in fighting corruption 
and the appearance of corruption, which the Supreme Court has suggested is probably the only 
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clear that although contribution limits helped alleviate the corrupting 
influence, or the appearance of a corrupting influence, of large sums 
of money donated to a campaign, limitations on a person’s own 
expenditures did not further that goal.43 All of the expenditure limits 
in FECA—and expenditure limits in general—were held to be 
unconstitutional.44 
B. Post-Buckley Challenges to Trigger Provisions Create a Circuit 
Split 
In 1994, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals heard a challenge to a 
campaign finance law containing a trigger provision in Day v. 
Holahan.45 The trigger provision at issue in Day was part of 
Minnesota’s public campaign financing system.46 As in other public 
campaign financing systems,47 Minnesota law required candidates 
participating in the system to abide by expenditure limits in order to 
receive public funding for their campaign.48 The trigger provision 
was activated when independent expenditures49 were made 
advocating for the defeat of the publicly financed candidates or in 
support of nonparticipating candidates.50 Once triggered, the 
provision increased the expenditure limits of any publicly funded 
candidates by the amount of the independent expenditures and 
                                                                                                                 
compelling interest that can justify a substantial burden on expenditures.”). 
 43. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 53 (“Indeed, the use of personal funds reduces the candidate’s dependence 
on outside contributions and thereby counteracts the coercive pressures and attendant risks of abuse to 
which the Act’s contribution limitations are directed.” (emphasis added)). 
 44. Id. at 39–59. The provisions struck down in Buckley were a $1,000 limitation on expenditures 
“relative to a clearly identified candidate” by most individuals and groups, a limitation on expenditures 
by candidates from personal or family resources, and a limitation on overall campaign expenditures by 
candidates. Id. 
 45. Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356 (8th Cir. 1994). 
 46. MINN. STAT. §§ 10A.01–.38 (2010); MINN. STAT. §§ 10A.40–.51 (repealed 1999). 
 47. See Briffault, supra note 4. 
 48. MINN. STAT. § 10A.25(1) (2010). 
 49. In general campaign finance usage, an independent expenditure is an expenditure for “a 
communication expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate” that is not 
made “in cooperation . . . with” or “at the request . . . of” a candidate. 11 C.F.R. § 100.16(a) (2010). 
 50. MINN. STAT. § 10A.25(13) (repealed 1999). Unlike the other trigger provisions discussed in this 
Comment, the provision at issue in Day was not triggered, in whole or in part, by the spending of 
opposing candidates. 
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granted those candidates an additional public subsidy equal to one-
half of the independent expenditures.51 After finding that the trigger 
provision had a “chilling effect” on political speech,52 the court 
analyzed the provision as a limit on independent expenditures.53 
Following the guidance of Buckley in dealing with expenditure limits, 
the court used strict scrutiny as its standard of review.54 The court 
invalidated the provision because the state’s asserted interest in 
encouraging participation in the campaign finance system was “not 
legitimate” and the burden placed on free speech would not satisfy 
“even the most cursory scrutiny.”55 
Between 1994 and 2008, three other circuit courts of appeal also 
heard challenges to trigger provisions: the Sixth Circuit in Gable v. 
Patton,56 the First Circuit in Daggett v. Commission on 
Governmental Ethics and Election Practices,57 and the Fourth Circuit 
                                                                                                                 
 51. Id. 
 52. Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356, 1360 (8th Cir. 1994). Many of the “independent expenders” 
alleged that they were choosing not to make independent expenditures because they knew that 
candidates they did not support would benefit as a result of the trigger provision. Id. The court referred 
to this as “self-censorship.” Id. 
 53. See id. at 1360–63. 
 54. Id. at 1361 (“Notwithstanding the . . . infringement on protected constitutional rights perpetrated 
by [the trigger provision], the statute may be upheld as against constitutional challenge if the state can 
show that it is narrowly drawn to serve a compelling state interest.”). 
 55. Id. at 1361–62. After noting that “participation was approaching 100%” prior to the enactment of 
the trigger provision, the court quipped, “One hardly could be faulted for concluding that this 
‘compelling’ state interest was contrived for purposes of this litigation.” Id. at 1361. 
 56. Gable v. Patton, 142 F.3d 940 (6th Cir. 1998). In Gable, a candidate for Governor of Kentucky 
challenged, on First Amendment grounds, a trigger provision in Kentucky’s system of public campaign 
financing that was triggered when a nonparticipating candidate reached more than $1.8 million in 
combined contributions and expenditures. Id. at 943, 947. The practical effect of the trigger was to lift 
the expenditure limit of candidates participating in the public financing system, while allowing them to 
continue to receive the contribution-matching subsidy in the system. Id. at 947. The court framed the 
First Amendment challenge as a question of whether candidates are coerced into accepting the public 
funding, stating, “[T]he central question . . . is whether the [t]rigger . . . rises to the level of 
constitutional coercion.” Id. at 948. The court affirmed the district court ruling of the trigger provision’s 
constitutionality because it was not “different in kind from clearly constitutional incentives.” Id. at 949. 
 57.  Daggett v. Comm’n on Gov’tal Ethics & Election Practices, 205 F.3d 445 (1st Cir. 2000). 
Daggett presented a challenge to a provision in Maine’s system of public campaign financing that was 
triggered when a nonparticipating candidate “raised,” via contributions, independent expenditures, or 
expenditures, more than a threshold amount. Id. at 451. When triggered, the provision provided a dollar-
for-dollar match to the publicly funded candidate, subject to a specified maximum amount, for each 
dollar over the threshold that the nonparticipating candidate raised. Id. Finding that the trigger provision 
did not create a burden on the candidate’s First Amendment right to free speech, the court upheld the 
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in North Carolina Right to Life Committee Fund for Independent 
Political Expenditures v. Leake.58 Although each of the trigger 
provisions at issue was similar to the provision invalidated by the 
Eight Circuit in Day, the First, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits all found 
that the trigger provisions did not burden First Amendment rights and 
were constitutionally valid.59 
In diverging from the holding in Day, all three circuit courts that 
found the trigger provisions to be constitutional cited a case the 
Eighth Circuit decided two years after Day: Rosenstiel v. 
Rodriguez.60 In Rosenstiel, the court considered another trigger 
provision that was part of the Minnesota public campaign financing 
system.61 A nonparticipating candidate would activate this trigger 
after surpassing a statutorily defined threshold of contributions or 
expenditures.62 Once triggered, the provision lifted the expenditure 
limit on the publicly funded candidate, but still entitled that candidate 
to the government subsidy inherent in the system.63 Although the 
participating candidate was no longer required to abide by the 
expenditure limit, no additional matching funds were provided.64 
Unlike in its holding in Day, the court found that this trigger 
                                                                                                                 
provision without analyzing it under any level of scrutiny. See id. at 464–65. 
 58. N.C. Right to Life Comm. Fund for Indep. Political Expenditures v. Leake, 524 F.3d 427 (4th 
Cir. 2008). Leake involved a challenge to a provision in North Carolina’s system of public campaign 
financing that is triggered when a nonparticipating candidate’s “funds in opposition” amount reaches a 
threshold level. Id. at 433. The funds in opposition amount is calculated as the greater amount of funds 
raised or spent, plus the amount of independent expenditures made in support of the nonparticpating 
candidate or against their publicly funded opponent. Id. Like the provision challenged in Daggett, the 
result of the trigger provision is a dollar-for-dollar match to the publicly funded candidate, subject to a 
specified maximum amount, for each dollar in excess of the funds in opposition amount. Id. Citing both 
Daggett and Gable, the court found that the trigger provision did not burden the First Amendment rights 
of nonparticipating candidates. Id. at 437. 
 59. See supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text. For a detailed description of the public funding 
systems in Kentucky, Maine, and North Carolina as well as additional analysis of Day, Gable, Daggett, 
and Leake, see Chen Li, Article, Public Funding After Davis v. FEC: Is Campaign Finance Reform in 
the States Still Legally Viable?, 20 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 279, 291–97 (2010). 
 60. Rosenstiel v. Rodriguez, 101 F.3d 1544 (8th Cir. 1996). 
 61. MINN. STAT. §§ 10A.01–.38 (2010); MINN. STAT. §§ 10A.40–.51 (repealed 1999). For more on 
the operation of the Minnesota system, see supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 62. MINN. STAT. § 10A.25(10)(a) (2010). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
10
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 5
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol28/iss2/5
2012] CAMPAIGN FINANCE 477 
provision did not burden the First Amendment rights of 
nonparticipating candidates.65 The court further stated that even if it 
did create a burden on free speech, it would survive strict scrutiny.66 
Because Day revolved around a challenge to a provision that was 
triggered by independent expenditures and resulted in matching 
funds, whereas Rosenstiel dealt with a provision that was triggered 
by candidate expenditures and did not result in matching funds, the 
cases are distinguishable. However, the First, Fourth, and Sixth 
Circuits all saw Rosenstiel as either persuasive authority or 
weakening the authority of Day.67 
C. Davis v. FEC: The Supreme Court Hears a Challenge to Trigger 
Provisions 
Although the Supreme Court heard many cases dealing with 
restrictions on either campaign contributions or campaign 
expenditures—and sometimes both—after Buckley,68 the Court did 
not hear a case dealing with a trigger provision until Davis v. FEC in 
                                                                                                                 
 65. Rosenstiel, 101 F.3d at 1552–53. Although the Eighth Circuit ruled otherwise, there is evidence 
that similar trigger provisions in other states have created a burden on candidates’ free speech rights. See 
infra note 179. 
 66. Id. In his dissent in Rosenstiel, Judge Lay argued that with Day as precedent, the trigger 
provision was unconstitutional. Id. at 1562, 1565 (Lay, J., dissenting). 
 67. See N.C. Right to Life Comm. Fund for Indep. Political Expenditures v. Leake, 524 F.3d 427, 
438 (4th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he Day decision appears to be an anomaly even within the Eighth Circuit, as 
demonstrated by that court’s later decision in Rosenstiel v. Rodriguez . . . .”); Daggett v. Comm’n on 
Gov’tal Ethics & Election Practices, 205 F.3d 445, 464 n.25 (1st Cir. 2000) (“[T]he continuing vitality 
of Day is open to question.”); Gable v. Patton, 142 F.3d 940, 949 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing to Rosenstiel, 
with no mention of Day, as support for finding a trigger provision constitutional). 
 68. See generally, e.g., FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007) (finding that the 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) unconstitutionally precluded an organization’s political 
advertisements); Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006) (plurality opinion) (holding unconstitutional a 
Vermont campaign finance statute that had contribution limits that were too restrictive and not narrowly 
tailored to the compelling state interest); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) (dealing with several 
challenges to contribution limits in the BCRA); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000) 
(reversing an appeals court decision that invalidated a Missouri campaign finance statute that limited 
campaign contributions); Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604 (1996) 
(holding that the limits on independent political party expenditures in FECA were unconstitutional); 
FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480 (1985) (affirming a holding that the 
section of the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act that limited political contributions violated the 
First Amendment); First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (finding a Massachusetts 
statute that forbade certain expenditures to be unconstitutional). 
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2008.69 Jack Davis, the appellant in that case, had run two largely 
self-financed campaigns for a seat in the U.S. House of 
Representatives and had lost to the incumbent both times.70 In his 
lawsuit, Davis challenged a trigger provision71 in the Bipartisan 
Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA)72—the “Millionaire’s 
Amendment”—as being in violation of his First Amendment right to 
free speech.73 
Unlike the provisions of FECA in Buckley, which were basic limits 
on contribution and expenditure amounts affecting all candidates for 
federal office,74 the Millionaire’s Amendment of the BCRA relaxed 
the contribution limits and lifted the caps on coordinated party 
expenditures75 only for the candidate whose opponent triggered the 
amendment.76 A candidate would trigger the amendment by reaching 
a statutorily defined amount of campaign funds, including the 
candidate’s own personal expenditures, referred to as the opposition 
personal funds amount (OPFA).77 For instance, suppose candidate A 
and candidate B were running against each other for federal office 
when the Millionaire’s Amendment was in effect. At the beginning 
                                                                                                                 
 69. Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724 (2008). 
 70. Id. at 731 (“Davis . . . spent $1.2 million, principally his own funds, on his 2004 
campaign. . . . He reports spending $2.3 million in 2006, all but $126,000 of which came from personal 
funds.” (citation omitted)). Some experts feel that entrenchment of incumbents is a side effect of many 
campaign finance regulations. See Sullivan, supra note 31, at 685–87; Sunstein, supra note 26, at 1400–
03. 
 71. 2 U.S.C. § 441a-1 (2006), invalidated by Davis, 554 U.S. at 724. 
 72. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.). The BCRA is commonly referred to as the 
“McCain-Feingold Act.” E.g., Esenberg, supra note 30, at 300. 
 73. Davis, 554 U.S. at 749. 
 74. See supra Part I.A. 
 75. Coordinated party expenditures are special contributions made to candidates for federal office by 
national and state political party committees. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d) (2006); 11 C.F.R. § 109.32 (2010). 
 76. 2 U.S.C. § 441a-1 (2006), invalidated by Davis, 554 U.S. at 724; see also Davis, 554 U.S. at 729 
(“[When triggered,] the candidate’s opponent . . . may receive individual contributions at treble the 
normal limit . . . and may accept coordinated party expenditures without limit.”). 
 77. Richard Esenberg summarized the OPFA and trigger provision as follows: 
Essentially . . . the ‘opposition personal funds amount’ (OPFA) [is] obtained by adding each candidate’s 
expenditure of personal funds to 50% of the funds raised from contributors. If one candidate enjoyed an 
advantage in excess of $350,000, the asymmetrical limits would apply to the disadvantaged candidate 
until the OPFA advantage was eliminated. 
Esenberg, supra note 30, at 319 n.222. 
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of the campaign, both candidates would be subject to specified limits 
on contributions and coordinated party expenditures. However, if 
candidate A’s campaign funds exceeded the OPFA during the 
campaign, the contribution limits for candidate B would be relaxed 
and the cap on candidate B’s coordinated party expenditures would 
be completely lifted. 
Considering Davis’s appeal, the Court first suggested that his 
argument would “plainly fail” if the trigger provision had simply 
raised contribution limits for all candidates.78 However, because the 
trigger provision did not raise contribution limits across the board, 
the Court turned to an analysis of whether the provision burdened 
Davis’s First Amendment right to free speech.79 The Court noted 
that, unlike the FECA provisions challenged in Buckley, the 
Millionaire’s Amendment did not create a limit on a candidate’s 
expenditures.80 However, according to the Court, the Millionaire’s 
Amendment imposed an “unprecedented penalty”81 on any candidate 
who triggered the provision and should therefore be treated as if it 
were a limit on expenditures.82 Significantly, the Court cited Day in 
support of the proposition that the trigger provision was a burden on 
First Amendment rights, thereby reinvigorating the debate over 
whether or not Day was weakened by Rosenstiel.83 Analyzing the 
Millionaire’s Amendment as a limit on expenditures, the Court 
applied strict scrutiny.84 The Court recognized that the government’s 
                                                                                                                 
 78. Davis, 554 U.S at 737. In support of this suggestion, the Supreme Court revisited the less 
stringent Buckley scrutiny standard of review applied to contribution limits in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). Id. For more information on the Buckley Court’s handling of contribution 
limits, see supra Part I.A. 
 79. Davis, 554 U.S. at 736–40. 
 80. Id. at 738–39. 
 81. In describing the result of the Millionaire’s Amendment as a “penalty,” the court noted that 
candidates who triggered the provision were subjected to “discriminatory fundraising limitations.” See 
id. at 743. 
 82. See id. at 738–40. The Court went further: “Even if [the Millionaire’s Amendment] were 
characterized as a limit on contributions rather than expenditures, it is doubtful whether it would 
survive.” Id. at 740 n.7. 
 83. Id. at 739; see also supra Part I.B. 
 84. See Davis, 554 U.S. at 740 (“Because [the Millionaire’s Amendment] imposes a substantial 
burden on the exercise of the First Amendment right to use personal funds for campaign speech, that 
provision cannot stand unless it is ‘justified by a compelling state interest.’” (quoting FEC v. Mass. 
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asserted anticorruption interest was compelling, but found that a 
trigger provision penalizing a candidate’s spending did not serve that 
interest.85 Additionally, the Court again denied that an equalization 
rationale was a compelling interest.86 By a 5–4 margin, the Supreme 
Court found the Millionaire’s Amendment unconstitutional.87 
D. Post-Davis Challenges to Trigger Provisions Exacerbate the 
Circuit Split 
Far from resolving the circuit split,88 the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Davis caused even more confusion as lower courts struggled to 
determine whether the Davis holding regarding the BCRA applied to 
various trigger provisions in individual state campaign finance 
systems. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in McComish v. 
Bennett,89 joined the First, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits in finding 
trigger provisions unconstitutional.90 Conversely, as the Eighth 
Circuit did in Day,91 both the Second Circuit, in Green Party of 
Connecticut v. Garfield,92 and the Eleventh Circuit, in Scott v. 
Roberts,93 found trigger provisions to be unconstitutional. 
                                                                                                                 
Citizens for Life, Inc. 479 U.S. 238, 256 (1986))). 
 85. Id. at 740–41 (“The burden imposed by [the Millionaire’s Amendment] 
on . . . expenditure[s] . . . is not justified by [the anticorruption interest]. The Buckley Court reasoned 
that reliance on personal funds reduces the threat of corruption, and therefore [the Millionaire’s 
Amendment], by discouraging use of personal funds, disserves the anticorruption interest.”). 
 86. Id. at 741–42. 
 87. Id. at 727, 744. In a strongly worded dissent, Justice Stevens began by revisiting, and urging 
reversal of, the Court’s holding in Buckley v. Valeo that expenditure limits are unconstitutional. Id. at 
749–52 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also supra note 33. However, even working within the confines of 
the Buckley framework, Justice Stevens would have found the trigger provision at issue in Davis to be 
constitutional. Davis, 554 U.S. at 752–53 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[R]educing the importance of 
wealth as a criterion for public office and countering the perception that seats in the United States 
Congress are available for purchase by the wealthiest bidder—are important Government 
interests. . . . Congress . . . crafted a solution that was carefully tailored to those concerns.”). 
 88. See supra Part I.B. 
 89. McComish v. Bennett, 611 F.3d 510 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d sub nom. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s 
Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011). 
 90. See supra Part I.B. 
 91. See supra Part I.B. 
 92. Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield, 616 F.3d 213 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied sub nom. Green 
Party of Conn. v. Lenge, 131 S. Ct. 3090 (2011) (mem.). 
 93. Scott v. Roberts, 612 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2010). 
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1. McComish v. Bennett: Trigger Provisions Satisfy Intermediate 
Scrutiny 
In 2010, the Ninth Circuit decided McComish— the first challenge 
to a trigger provision to reach a federal circuit court on appeal after 
Davis.94 The trigger provision at issue in McComish95 was part of 
Arizona’s public financing system for elections.96 As in most trigger 
provision cases, challengers to the law included candidates for office 
and various political funds.97 In Arizona’s system, a publicly funded 
candidate agreed to be bound by campaign contribution and 
expenditure limits in exchange for a public subsidy.98 A 
nonparticipating candidate would trigger the challenged provision by 
spending more than a publicly funded candidate’s initial public 
grant.99 The provision could also be triggered if the amount of the 
nonparticipating candidate’s personal expenditures, combined with 
independent expenditures used in support of the nonparticipating 
candidate or against the publicly funded candidate, exceeded the 
initial public grant.100 Once triggered, the provision granted the 
publicly funded candidate close to a dollar-for-dollar match of the 
spending of the nonparticipating candidate, plus close to a dollar-for-
dollar match of the value of the independent expenditures used in 
support of the nonparticipating candidate or against the publicly 
funded candidate.101 
Unlike the other circuits that had invalidated trigger provisions 
before Davis,102 the Ninth Circuit did not rule that the provision 
created no burden on free speech.103 Instead, the court viewed the law 
                                                                                                                 
 94. McComish, 611 F.3d 510. 
 95. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-952 (2010), invalidated by Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club 
PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011). 
 96. Citizens Clean Elections Act, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-940 to -961 (2010). 
 97. See McComish, 611 F.3d at 517–19 (describing each of the plaintiffs’ individualized First 
Amendment concerns). 
 98. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-941 (2010). 
 99. Id. § 16-952. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. For the court’s thorough description of the trigger provision, see McComish, 611 F.3d at 516. 
 102. See supra Part I.B. 
 103. McComish, 611 F.3d at 522–23 (“We will only conclude that the Act burdens speech to the 
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as burdening speech in an “indirect” or “minimal” fashion.104 The 
Ninth Circuit also minimized the Supreme Court’s citation to Day in 
Davis as “for a single, limited proposition.”105 Thus, the Ninth 
Circuit did not apply strict scrutiny or even Buckley scrutiny106 to the 
trigger provision.107 Instead, the court found that since the provision 
did not directly burden First Amendment free speech rights, 
“intermediate scrutiny” should be applied as the standard of 
review.108 Under intermediate scrutiny, a court looks to whether a 
challenged law has a “substantial relation” to a “sufficiently 
important governmental interest.”109 The Ninth Circuit acknowledged 
that the Supreme Court, in both Buckley and Citizens United v. 
FEC,110 used intermediate scrutiny only when examining disclosure 
requirements in campaign finance laws, but found that the burden 
placed on candidates by Arizona’s trigger provision was more 
analogous to a disclosure requirement than to an expenditure limit.111 
Satisfied that the trigger provision reduced the appearance of quid 
pro quo corruption and encouraged participation in the public 
financing system, the court held that the provision was substantially 
related to the state’s asserted anticorruption interest and found no 
First Amendment violation.112 The decision was appealed, and the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari and consolidated the case with 
                                                                                                                 
extent that Plaintiffs have proven that the specter of matching funds has actually chilled or deterred them 
from accepting campaign contributions or making expenditures.”). 
 104. Id. at 523 (“Based on the record before us, we conclude that any burden the Act imposes on 
Plaintiffs’ speech is indirect or minimal.”). 
 105. Id. at 524 n.9. The Ninth Circuit invoked the Rosenstiel decision to question Day as precedent: 
“We decline to follow the Eighth Circuit down a road that even it refused to follow.” Id. For more on the 
Day and Rosenstiel decisions, see supra Part I.B. 
 106. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 107. See McComish, 611 F.3d at 525. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id.; see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 890 (9th ed. 2009). 
 110. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 111. See McComish, 611 F.3d at 525. (“We conclude that the burden created by the Act is most 
analogous to the burden of disclosure and disclaimer requirements in Buckley and Citizens United. 
Following the Supreme Court’s precedents in those cases, because the Act imposes only a minimal 
burden on fully protected speech, intermediate scrutiny applies.”). 
 112. Id. at 525–27. 
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Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett in 
November of 2010.113 
2. Green Party of Connecticut v. Garfield: Trigger Provisions are 
an Unconstitutional Burden on First Amendment Rights 
Shortly after McComish was decided, the Second Circuit handed 
down its decision in Green Party of Connecticut.114 Green Party of 
Connecticut involved Connecticut’s Citizens’ Election Program 
(CEP), the state’s system of public campaign financing.115 
Challengers to the system objected—on First Amendment grounds—
to two separate trigger provisions within the CEP.116 A 
nonparticipating candidate would activate the first trigger by 
spending or receiving campaign funds in excess of the publicly 
funded candidate’s expenditure limit.117 Once triggered, the publicly 
funded candidate would receive additional public grants based on 
how far over the limit the nonparticipating candidate ventured—up to 
a limit of 100% of the system’s initial public subsidy.118 The second 
provision related to independent expenditures that were used to 
advocate for the defeat of the publicly financed candidate119 and was 
triggered when those expenditures, plus the nonparticipating 
candidate’s own expenditures, exceeded the publicly funded 
                                                                                                                 
 113. McComish v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 644 (2010). 
 114. Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield, 616 F.3d 213 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied sub nom. Green 
Party of Conn. v. Lenge, 131 S. Ct. 3090 (2011) (mem.). 
 115. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 9-700 to -759 (2011). 
 116. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 9-713 to -714 (repealed 2010). The challengers to the public financing 
program consisted of minor political parties, lobbyists, contractors, and a candidate for state office. 
Green Party of Conn., 616 F.3d at 222. 
 117. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-713 (repealed 2010). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Unlike provisions in other states dealing with independent expenditures, the second trigger 
provision in Connecticut’s system did not count independent expenditures made in support of the 
nonparticipating candidate towards the threshold amount. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-714 (repealed 2010). 
Instead, only independent expenditures that advocated for the defeat of the publicly financed candidate 
were counted. Id. Although outside the scope of this Comment, it is possible the Connecticut legislature 
felt that clean elections were damaged more by negative campaigning than general advocacy or that 
basing a trigger provision on support for a candidate was more likely to create a burden on First 
Amendment rights and be struck down. See id. 
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candidate’s public grant amount.120 The result was a dollar-for-dollar 
match of the applicable independent expenditures in excess of the 
initial public grant.121 
The Second Circuit began by stating that the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Davis governed its analysis.122 In comparing the first trigger 
provision in the CEP to the trigger provision in Davis, the court 
explained that the provision invalidated in Davis only allowed for the 
“possibility” that one candidate’s spending could result in that 
candidate’s opponent raising more money under relaxed 
restrictions.123 The court stressed that the trigger provision in the 
CEP was “harsher” than the one in Davis because it left “no doubt” 
that the nonparticipating candidate’s opponent would receive 
additional funds as a result of the matching funds benefit.124 Since the 
trigger provision placed a “substantial burden” on First Amendment 
rights, the court analyzed the provision under strict scrutiny125—as 
did the Supreme Court in Davis.126 Turning to the possible state 
interests in enacting the trigger provision, the Second Circuit rejected 
an equalization interest127 and determined that the provision, which 
was essentially an expenditure limitation, did not serve an 
anticorruption interest.128 Thus, the court found the first trigger 
                                                                                                                 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. For the court’s description of both trigger provisions, see Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield, 
616 F.3d at 221–22. 
 122. Green Party of Conn., 616 F.3d at 244 (“The Supreme Court’s analysis in Davis directly governs 
plaintiffs’ challenge to the CEP’s trigger provisions . . . .”). 
 123. Id. at 244–45 (“In Davis . . . there was some possibility that the non-self-financed 
candidate . . . would be unable to raise additional money under the relaxed restrictions.”). 
 124. Id. at 245 (“The penalty imposed by the [trigger provision in the CEP], therefore, is harsher than 
the penalty in Davis, as it leaves no doubt that . . . the opponent . . . will receive additional money.”). 
 125. Id. at 245 (“[T]he [trigger] provision ‘imposes a substantial burden on the exercise of the First 
Amendment right to use personal funds for campaign speech.’ To be upheld under plaintiffs’ First 
Amendment challenge, the provision must be ‘justified by a compelling state interest.’” (citation 
omitted) (quoting Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 740 (2008))). 
 126. See supra Part I.C. 
 127. Green Party of Conn., 616 F.3d at 245 (“[I]nsofar as the [trigger] provision is the result of a 
desire ‘to level electoral opportunities,’ [it is], under Davis, clearly unconstitutional.” (quoting Davis, 
554 U.S. at 741)). 
 128. Green Party of Conn., 616 F.3d at 245 (“Since the CEP is justified by a governmental interest in 
eliminating corruption or the perception of corruption, pursuant to the Supreme Court’s teaching in 
Davis, encouraging participation in the CEP does not justify the burden on First Amendment rights 
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provision to be unconstitutional.129 The court analyzed the second 
provision in an almost identical fashion and invalidated it as well.130 
Furthermore, as the Supreme Court did in Davis, the Second Circuit 
cited Day, the previously questioned Eighth Circuit decision,131 as 
support for finding the second trigger provision to be in violation of 
the First Amendment.132 
3. Scott v. Roberts: Trigger Provisions Are Not Narrowly Tailored 
to Serve the Anticorruption Interest 
In early July of 2010, prior to the decision in Green Party of 
Connecticut, Florida gubernatorial candidate Rick Scott133 filed a 
complaint to enjoin a trigger provision in a Florida campaign finance 
law.134 After losing at the district court level, Scott appealed to the 
Eleventh Circuit.135 The trigger provision that Scott challenged 
provided a publicly funded candidate with a dollar-for-dollar match 
for every dollar the nonparticipating candidate spent over a 
statutorily defined expenditure limit.136 Unlike any of the previously 
discussed trigger provisions, the Florida provision was triggered only 
by candidate expenditures.137 
                                                                                                                 
caused by the [trigger] provision.”). 
 129. Id. (“Thus, we conclude, pursuant to Davis, that the CEP’s [first trigger] provision violates the 
First Amendment.”). In a tersely worded footnote, the court also referenced the Ninth Circuit’s opinion 
in McComish v. Bennett and declared, “We are not persuaded by the Ninth Circuit’s opinion . . . .” Id. at 
245 n.19. 
 130. See id. at 245–46. 
 131. See supra Part I.B. 
 132. Green Party of Conn., 616 F.3d at 246. 
 133. For more background on Rick Scott, see supra notes 1–2, 16 and accompanying text. 
 134. See supra notes 9–12 and accompanying text. 
 135. Scott v. Roberts, 612 F.3d 1279, 1281 (11th Cir. 2010) 
 136. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 137. Compare Scott 612 F.3d 1279 (analyzing a provision triggered only after a candidate’s 
expenditures exceed a threshold amount), with Green Party of Conn., 616 F.3d 213 (analyzing a 
provision triggered by contributions or expenditures and another provision triggered by independent 
expenditures), McComish v. Bennett, 611 F.3d 510 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d sub nom. Ariz. Free Enter. 
Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011) (analyzing a provision triggered by 
expenditures or independent expenditures), N.C. Right to Life Comm. Fund for Indep. Political 
Expenditures v. Leake, 524 F.3d 427 (4th Cir. 2008) (analyzing a provision triggered by contributions, 
expenditures, or independent expenditures), Daggett v. Comm’n on Gov’tal Ethics & Election Practices, 
205 F.3d 445 (1st Cir. 2000) (analyzing a provision triggered by contributions, expenditures, or 
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In reviewing the trigger provision, the Eleventh Circuit agreed 
with the Second Circuit and relied heavily on Davis.138 The court 
began by describing the trigger provision as a substantial burden on 
Scott’s First Amendment right to free speech.139 The court discussed 
the Supreme Court’s citation to Day in Davis to further this 
proposition.140 Because of the substantial burden it had on speech, the 
court stated that it was bound to examine the trigger provision under 
strict scrutiny.141 The state’s asserted interest was, predictably, an 
anticorruption rationale.142 The court did not find the state’s 
argument persuasive, explaining that use of a candidate’s personal 
funds actually prevents the appearance of quid pro quo corruption.143 
The court next suggested that even if the trigger provision served the 
anticorruption interest, it was not narrowly tailored to that end.144 
Because Florida did not prove that the trigger provision “further[ed] 
the anticorruption interest in the least restrictive manner,” the court 
ruled that Scott was likely to prevail on the merits of his claim and 
                                                                                                                 
independent expenditures), Gable v. Patton, 142 F.3d 940 (6th Cir. 1998) (analyzing a provision 
triggered by contributions or expenditures), Rosenstiel v. Rodriguez, 101 F.3d 1544 (8th Cir. 1996) 
(analyzing a provision triggered by contributions or expenditures), and Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356 
(8th Cir. 1994) (analyzing a provision triggered by independent expenditures). 
 138. See Scott, 612 F.3d at 1290–94 (finding that Scott was likely to prevail on the merits because the 
trigger provision was a burden on his First Amendment rights and was unlikely to survive under strict 
scrutiny). 
 139. Id. at 1291 (“We agree with Scott . . . that, under Davis, the burden of Scott’s right of free speech 
is substantial.”). 
 140. Id. at 1292. The Supreme Court’s citation to Day in Davis is discussed supra Part I.C. The 
Second Circuit also cited Day in Green Party of Connecticut, 616 F.3d at 246. 
 141. Scott, 612 F.3d. at 1290 (“We agree with Scott that Davis requires us to subject the [trigger 
provision] to strict scrutiny.”). 
 142. Id. at 1292 (“The [State] and McCollum contend that the subsidy furthers the anticorruption 
interest by encouraging participation in the public campaign financing system of Florida, which in turn 
prevents corruption or the appearance of corruption.”). The court also rejected any sort of equalization 
interest: “At bottom, the Florida public campaign financing system appears primarily to advantage 
candidates with little money or who exercise restraint in fundraising. That is, the system levels the 
electoral playing field, and that purpose is constitutionally problematic.” Id. at 1293. 
 143. See id. at 1292–93 (“The Supreme Court has explained that ‘the use of personal funds reduces 
the candidate’s dependence on outside contributions and thereby counteracts the coercive pressures and 
attendant risks of abuse’ of campaign contributions.” (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 53 (1976) 
(per curiam))). 
 144. See id. at 1294 (“Even if we were certain that the public financing system of Florida furthers an 
anticorruption interest, we agree that Scott has proved a likelihood that the [trigger provision] is not the 
least restrictive means of encouraging that participation.”). 
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preliminarily enjoined the state from releasing the funds to Scott’s 
opponent.145 Shortly thereafter, the State of Florida decided not to 
appeal the injunction.146 
II. ARIZONA FREE ENTERPRISE CLUB’S FREE ENTERPRISE PAC V. 
BENNETT: THE SUPREME COURT CURES THE TRIGGER PROVISION 
CIRCUIT SPLIT 
In June of 2011, the Supreme Court decided Arizona Free 
Enterprise Club’s Free Enterprise PAC v. Bennett147 and reversed the 
judgment of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.148 The Court, by the 
same 5–4 margin as in Davis v. FEC,149 held that the trigger 
provision in Arizona’s campaign finance system was 
unconstitutional.150 Chief Justice John Roberts wrote the majority 
opinion for the divided Court.151 Justice Elena Kagan wrote the 
impassioned—and highly quotable152—opinion for the dissenters.153 
                                                                                                                 
 145. Id. at 1298. 
 146. See John Frank, Spending Cap Ruling Won’t be Fought, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Florida), Aug. 
5, 2010, at 5B, available at 2010 WLNR 15565673 (“Florida secretary of state spokeswoman Jennifer 
Davis said the office would not challenge the decision. ‘We need some finality to move through the 
election process,’ she said. The appellate court’s ardent decision made a rehearing unlikely to 
succeed.”). 
 147. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011). This was the 
appeal of the Ninth Circuit case decided under the name McComish v. Bennett. See supra note 113 and 
accompanying text. 
 148. Ariz. Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2829. 
 149. Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724 (2008). Although the margin was the same, two new Justices took 
part in the decision. Between Davis in 2008 and Arizona Free Enterprise in 2011, Justices Sonia 
Sotomayor and Elena Kagan replaced retiring Justices David Souter and John Paul Stevens, 
respectively, on the Supreme Court. See Joan Biskupic, ‘Dynamic’ Duo of Kagan, Sotomayor Add Vigor 
to Court, USA TODAY, Mar. 4, 2011, at 9A, available at 2011 WLNR 4245425. 
 150. Ariz. Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2812–13. 
 151. Id. at 2813–29. 
 152. See id. at 2835 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[The Petitioners] are making a novel argument: that 
Arizona violated their First Amendment rights by disbursing funds to other speakers even though they 
could have received (but chose to spurn) the same financial assistance. Some people might call that 
chutzpah.”); id. at 2843 (“[T]he majority claims to have found three smoking guns that reveal the State’s 
true (and nefarious) intention to level the playing field. But the only smoke here is the majority’s, and it 
is the kind that goes with mirrors.”); id. at 2844 (“So the majority has no evidence—zero, none—that 
the objective of the Act is anything other than the interest that the State asserts . . . .”). 
 153. Id. at 2829–46. 
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A. The Majority Opinion: “Laws . . . that Inhibit Robust and Wide-
Open Political Debate Without Sufficient Justification Cannot 
Stand.”154 
Chief Justice Roberts began the majority opinion in Arizona Free 
Enterprise by recounting the facts and parties involved,155 focusing 
primarily on the operation of the trigger provision in Arizona’s 
campaign finance system.156 Turning to the Court’s campaign finance 
jurisprudence, the Chief Justice noted that the First Amendment “has 
its fullest and most urgent application to speech uttered during a 
campaign for political office”157 and “‘[l]aws that burden political 
speech are’ accordingly ‘subject to strict scrutiny.’”158 Next, he 
acknowledged that some campaign finance restrictions, such as 
contribution limits and disclosure requirements, are “less onerous,” 
and thus, the Court has subjected them to a “lower level of 
scrutiny.”159 
Explaining that Davis controlled the Court’s approach to this case, 
the Chief Justice concluded that the trigger provision was a 
“substantial burden” on the speech of a nonparticipating candidate.160 
Chief Justice Roberts recognized that the burden the Millionaire’s 
Amendment in Davis placed on a candidate’s right to free speech was 
different than the penalty in Arizona’s system.161 However, the 
trigger provision in Arizona, he explained, was “more 
constitutionally problematic” than the one in Davis because matching 
funds were guaranteed.162 The Millionaire’s Amendment only 
provided a potential for the candidate’s opponent to raise more 
funds.163 Using this logic, the Chief Justice explained that the Ninth 
                                                                                                                 
 154. Ariz. Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2829. 
 155. See supra Part I.D.1. 
 156. Ariz. Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2813–16. 
 157. Id. at 2817 (quoting Eu v. S.F. Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 158. Id. (quoting Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010)). 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 2818, 2824. 
 161. Id. at 2818. See supra Part I.C. for more on Davis and the Millionaire’s Amendment. 
 162. Ariz. Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2818. 
 163. Id. This was the same reasoning used by the court in Green Party of Connecticut v. Garfield, 616 
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Circuit’s analogy to the burden imposed by disclosure requirements 
was “not even close.”164 
Having determined that the trigger provision was a “substantial 
burden on the speech of privately financed candidates and 
independent expenditure groups” and therefore subject to strict 
scrutiny, Chief Justice Roberts transitioned to a discussion of whether 
the provision was justified by a compelling state interest.165 As the 
Court did in Davis, the Chief Justice emphatically discounted any 
type of equalization rationale as “a dangerous enterprise and one that 
cannot justify burdening protected speech.”166 Turning to Arizona’s 
asserted anticorruption interest, the Chief Justice invoked the Court’s 
decisions in Buckley v. Valeo, Davis, and Citizens United v. FEC to 
support the contention that limits on expenditures—by candidates or 
independent groups—do not prevent corruption or the appearance of 
corruption.167 Lastly, he addressed Arizona’s argument that allowing 
trigger provisions encouraged participation in the public financing 
system, which helped prevent candidates from being susceptible to 
bribes and corruption—an argument the Ninth Circuit found 
persuasive.168 “[B]urdening constitutionally protected speech” to 
encourage participation in a public financing system, he explained, 
“does not establish the constitutionality of the [trigger] provision.”169 
Cautioning that the “wisdom of public financing” was not questioned 
by this decision, the Court invalidated the trigger provision in 
                                                                                                                 
F.3d 213, 244–45 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied sub nom. Green Party of Conn. v. Lenge, 131 S. Ct. 3090 
(2011) (mem.). 
 164. Ariz. Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2822. 
 165. Id. at 2824. 
 166. Id. at 2826. For more on the equalization rationale, see supra note 42. 
 167. Id. at 2826–27. 
 168. McComish v. Bennett, 611 F.3d 510, 526 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d sub nom. Ariz. Free Enter. 
Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011) (“[T]he . . . anticorruption interest is 
further promoted by high participation in the program. The more candidates that [participate], the 
smaller the appearance among Arizona elected officials of being susceptible to quid pro quo corruption, 
because fewer of those elected officials will . . . be viewed as beholden to their campaign 
contributors . . . .”). 
 169. Ariz. Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2827. 
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Arizona’s public financing system and, presumably, trigger 
provisions in general.170  
B. The Dissent: “[D]emocracy is not a game.”171 
The main thrust of the dissenters’ disagreement with the majority 
was their belief that the trigger provision encouraged participation in 
Arizona’s public funding system by making it more effective, thereby 
serving the anticorruption interest.172 In her opinion, Justice Kagan 
explained that a significant weakness of public financing systems is 
the difficulty in finding the appropriate amount of funds to grant to a 
participating candidate.173 As she saw it, if the grant is set too low, 
candidates will not participate, but if it is set too high, it could be “an 
unsustainable burden” on the treasury.174 Justice Kagan referred to 
dealing with this problem as “finding the Goldilocks solution.”175 She 
felt that Arizona had found this “Goldilocks solution” by 
incorporating the trigger provision in its system.176 
Justice Kagan also disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that 
the trigger provision was a substantial burden on speech.177 She 
argued that the provision had the opposite result: “It subsidizes [the 
participating candidate’s speech] and so produces more political 
speech.”178 Her opinion stressed that the trigger provision did not 
restrict speech and referred to the evidence of any deterrence as 
“spotty at best.”179 To her, finding the trigger provision to be 
                                                                                                                 
 170. See id. at 2828–29. 
 171. Id. at 2846 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 172. See id. at 2829–46 
 173. Id. at 2831–32. 
 174. Id. at 2831. 
 175. Ariz. Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2832. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. at 2833. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at 2837 n.6. There is evidence available indicating that trigger provisions do chill speech in 
elections. Like Florida gubernatorial candidate Rick Scott in Scott v. Roberts, 612 F.3d 1279, 1283–84 
(11th Cir. 2010), candidates for office in Arizona have described ways that trigger provisions caused 
them to adjust their strategies and curb their campaign spending. Tony Bouie, a candidate for the 
Arizona House of Representatives and a plaintiff in Arizona Free Enterprise, testified that he delayed 
campaign expenditures because of the trigger provision and waited “until the last possible minute” to 
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constitutional would have fallen squarely within the Court’s 
campaign finance precedent.180 
Finally, Justice Kagan suggested that even if the trigger provision 
was a substantial burden—and therefore subject to strict scrutiny—
Arizona had presented a compelling interest that justified that 
burden.181 Returning to the thesis of the dissenting opinion, Justice 
Kagan explained that participation in the public funding system 
serves the anticorruption interest, which is an interest the Court has 
found to be compelling.182 She described the trigger provision as a 
“fine-tuning” of the lump-sum program approved in Buckley v. 
Valeo.183 Justice Kagan concluded the dissenting opinion by accusing 
the majority of not respecting the objectives of the people of Arizona: 
“less corruption [and] more speech.”184 
                                                                                                                 
spend money that would trigger the provision. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 9, McComish v. Bennett, 
131 S. Ct. 644 (2010) (No. 10-239), available at 
http://www.goldwaterinstitute.org/file/4948/download/4950. Further, an electronic and paper survey 
related to the trigger provision in Arizona’s public financing system was conducted of all primary 
candidates in the 2006 Arizona election. Michael Miller, Gaming Arizona: Public Money and Shifting 
Candidate Strategies, 41 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 527, 528 (2008). According to Michael Miller, the Ph.D. 
candidate who conducted the survey, “Stories [about shifting strategies] were echoed by every candidate 
who had ever run traditionally against a [publicly funded] opponent.” Id. at 529. One respondent 
metaphorically stated that every dollar spent over the threshold “starts feeding the alligator trying to eat 
me.” Id. at 528. In addition, Miller stated, “According to every informant I interviewed, 
[nonparticipating] candidates try to maximize the competitive effect of the money that they do spend by 
releasing funds at the last moment, giving the [publicly funded] candidate little time to react.” Id. at 529. 
Highlighting this point, the author relayed the story of a candidate who had participated in the public 
funding system two times and had received a trigger funds check the Friday before both elections, with 
no time to spend it, because the nonparticipating candidate had waited until the last minute to exceed the 
expenditure limit. Id. David M. Primo, who served as an expert witness when McComish was at the 
district court level, found similar evidence while gathering research. David M. Primo, “Clean 
Elections” Stifles Speech, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 18, 2010, 2:22 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-m-primo/clean-elections-stifles-s_b_686555.html. 
 180. Ariz. Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2838; see also id. at 2836–39 (reviewing the Court’s history of 
campaign finance and speech subsidy cases). 
 181. Id. at 2841. 
 182. Id. at 2841–43.   
 183. Id. at 2842. Chief Justice Roberts addressed this point in the majority opinion: “[T]he fact that 
the State’s matching mechanism may be more efficient than other alternatives—that it may help the 
State in . . . ‘fine-tuning’ its financing system to avoid a drain on public resources—is of no moment; 
‘the First Amendment does not permit the State to sacrifice speech for efficiency.’” Id. at 2824 (majority 
opinion) (citation omitted) (quoting Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 795 
(1988)). 
 184. Ariz. Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2845. 
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III. REPORTS OF THE DEMISE OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM HAVE 
BEEN GREATLY EXAGGERATED: REPLACING TRIGGER PROVISIONS 
WITH CONSTITUTIONAL REGULATIONS 
There has been some discussion that the invalidation of trigger 
provisions in Davis v. FEC and Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Free 
Enterprise PAC v. Bennett will signal the end of—or greatly diminish 
the effectiveness of—campaign finance regulation, public funding of 
campaigns, or both.185 Indeed, shortly after the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Arizona Free Enterprise, federal district courts in 
Florida186 and Maine187 struck down trigger provisions in those 
states’ campaign finance systems accordingly. Additionally, on the 
day after Arizona Free Enterprise was decided, the Supreme Court 
denied certiorari in the Green Party of Connecticut v. Lenge case 
(formerly Green Party of Connecticut v. Garfield)188 in which the 
Second Circuit invalidated two trigger provisions in Connecticut’s 
system of public campaign financing—the CEP.189 However, 
removing trigger provisions from campaign finance systems will not 
leave state and federal regulators unarmed to combat the primary 
                                                                                                                 
 185. See, e.g., Esenberg, supra note 30; E. Stewart Crosland, Note, Failed Rescue: Why Davis v. FEC 
Signals the End to Effective Clean Elections, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1265 (2009); Fevurly, supra note 
42; Emily C. Schuman, Note, Davis v. Federal Election Commission: Muddying the Clean Money 
Landscape, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 737 (2009); Editorial, Send in the Tycoons, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2010, 
at A26, available at 2010 WLNR 14077783; Jeremy Miller, Supreme Court Eviscerates Arizona’s 
Public Financing System, CITIZENS FOR RESP. & ETHICS IN WASH. BLOG (June 27, 2011), 
http://www.citizensforethics.org/blog/entry/supreme-court-eviscerates-arizonas-public-financing-
system. 
 186. Scott v. Browning, No. 4:10cv283-RH/WCS (N.D. Fla. June 28, 2011) (issuing a permanent 
injunction of the trigger provision that was temporarily enjoined in Scott v. Roberts, 612 F.3d 1279 
(11th Cir. 2010)); Brandon Larrabee, Federal Judge Upholds the Rick Scott Rule of Florida Campaign-
Finance, ORLANDO SENTINEL POL. PULSE BLOG (June 29, 2011, 9:06 PM), 
http://blogs.orlandosentinel.com/news_politics/2011/06/federal-judge-upholds-the-rick-scott-rule-of-
florida-campaign-finance.html. 
 187. Cushing v. McKee, No. 1:10-cv-00330-GZS (D. Me. July 21, 2011) (invalidating the trigger 
provision discussed in Daggett v. Commission on Governmental Ethics & Election Practices, 205 F.3d 
445 (1st Cir. 2000)); Clarke Canfield, Judge Strikes Down Maine’s Matching Funds Campaign Finance 
Law, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (July 21, 2011, 6:12 AM), 
http://bangordailynews.com/2011/07/20/politics/judge-strikes-down-maines-matching-funds-law/. 
 188. Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield, 616 F.3d 213, 218 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied sub nom. Green 
Party of Conn. v. Lenge, 131 S. Ct. 3090 (2011) (mem.). 
 189. Green Party of Conn. v. Lenge, 131 S. Ct. 3090. 
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evils of campaign financing: corruption and the appearance of 
corruption. Some commentators even see it as a positive sign for 
campaign finance reformers that the majority announced that public 
funding was “not [the Court’s] business”190 in Arizona Free 
Enterprise.191 Below are three measures that lawmakers can take to 
improve the effectiveness of campaign finance systems without the 
use of provisions triggered by candidate spending. 
A. Implement Comprehensive Disclosure Requirements 
Disclosure requirements aid voters by providing information as to 
those individuals, groups, and interests that are supporting a 
particular candidate—and the level of that support.192 This type of 
transparency can aid in the prevention of corruption because 
candidates will be less likely, or at least would seem to be less 
likely,193 to pay back financial supporters with improper political 
favors if those supporters are available for the public to research.194 
As previously discussed, the Supreme Court applies intermediate 
scrutiny, not strict scrutiny, to campaign finance regulations that 
require disclosure of financial supporters.195 Because of this lower 
level of scrutiny, these regulations are more likely to be found 
constitutional than regulations impacting expenditures. In fact, in the 
highly publicized Citizens United v. FEC decision, only Justice 
Clarence Thomas dissented from the portion of the holding that 
                                                                                                                 
 190. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2828 (2011). 
 191. See, e.g., Rick Hasen, The Arizona Campaign Finance Law: The Surprisingly Good News in the 
Supreme Court’s New Decision, NEW REPUBLIC (June 27, 2011, 1:07 PM), 
http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/90834/arizona-campaign-finance-supreme-court (“[T]he Court did 
not level a death blow to public financing laws. Instead, it said that the decision of cities, states, or 
Congress [to] enact public financing is ‘not our business.’”); see also Zephyr Teachout, What the Court 
Did and Didn’t Do, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/06/27/the-court-and-the-future-of-public-
financing/matching-funds-what-the-court-didnt-touch (discussing the future viability of public funding 
after Arizona Free Enterprise).  
 192. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 257 (4th ed. 2007). 
 193. As discussed, the Supreme Court is concerned not only with actual corruption, but with the 
appearance of corruption as well. See supra Part I.A. 
 194. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 192. 
 195. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
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found the disclosure and disclaimer requirements of the challenged 
law to be constitutional.196 In addition to the Supreme Court’s 
propensity to uphold these requirements,197 many commentators feel 
that mandating disclosure is one of the most effective and least 
constitutionally problematic methods of regulating campaign 
financing.198 
B. Provide Larger Initial Grants 
If the problem that necessitates trigger provisions in public funding 
systems is a disparity in spending power between participating and 
nonparticipating candidates, this disparity can be resolved up front by 
increasing the initial public grant.199 By providing this money at the 
outset, the constitutional problems faced by tying additional funds to 
the expenditures of nonparticipating candidates are avoided.200 
Furthermore, there is no need for nonparticipating candidates to have 
to adjust their spending strategies, after the initial decision to reject 
public funding, if the state provides the funds to their opponents at 
the outset.201 This is likely the easiest of the regulations to implement 
                                                                                                                 
 196. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 979–82 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).   
 197. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (finding disclosure and disclaimer requirements in the BCRA 
to be constitutional against an as-applied challenge); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) (finding 
disclosure and disclaimer requirements in the BCRA to be constitutional against a facial challenge); 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam) (upholding reporting and disclosure requirements in 
FECA). But see McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995) (finding disclosure 
requirements unconstitutional in an issue-based election). 
 198. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 192 (discussing the support among scholars for disclosure and 
disclaimer requirements); see also Richard L. Hasen, The Surprisingly Complex Case for Disclosure of 
Contributions and Expenditures Funding Sham Issue Advocacy, 48 UCLA L. REV. 265, 266 (2000) (“In 
the endless debate between supporters and opponents of campaign finance limits, the one thing both 
sides seem to have agreed upon is the need for effective disclosure of campaign contributions and 
expenditures.”). 
 199. This was one of the proposals that Rick Scott presented to show that Florida could satisfy its 
stated objectives with more narrowly tailored means than the trigger provision in Scott v. Roberts, 612 
F.3d 1279, 1294 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 200. The majority opinion in Arizona Free Enterprise stressed that the problem with the trigger 
provision was not the “amount of funding,” but the fact that the funding was provided “in direct 
response to . . . political speech. ”Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 
2806, 2824 (2011).  
 201. For examples of candidates shifting their strategies in light of trigger provisions, see supra note 
179. 
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for systems that formerly had trigger provisions because the funds 
allocated for the provisions could be used to pay the higher initial 
grants.202 
C. Develop Regulations that Focus on Contributions 
Like disclosure requirements, limits on contributions are also 
afforded a lower level of scrutiny than expenditure limits.203 
Although the Supreme Court has upheld various limits on 
contributions dating back to Buckley v. Valeo, contribution limits can 
run into constitutional problems if they are deemed to make a public 
financing system so lucrative that candidates are coerced into 
participating.204 Three provisions focusing on contributions are likely 
to be found constitutional if implemented, provided that they are not 
so onerous as to make the associated public funding system impliedly 
mandatory: cap gap provisions, multiplied contribution matching 
provisions, and contribution trigger provisions. 
1. Cap Gap Provisions 
A provision in a campaign finance system that provides a higher 
contribution limit for publicly funded candidates than for 
nonparticipating candidates is referred to as a cap gap.205 By making 
a public financing scheme more attractive to potential participants, a 
cap gap serves the anticorruption interest by encouraging candidates 
                                                                                                                 
 202. One issue with this approach is the “Goldilocks” problem discussed by Justice Kagan in her 
dissent in Arizona Free Enterprise, 131 S. Ct. at 2832 (Kagan, J., dissenting). Finding an initial grant 
that encourages participation, but does not bankrupt the treasury, is a common difficulty with campaign 
finance systems. Id. at 2831–32. 
 203. See supra Part I.A. 
 204. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 57 n.65 (1976) (per curiam) (“Congress . . . may condition 
acceptance of public funds on an agreement by the candidate to abide by specified expenditure 
limitations. Just as a candidate may voluntarily limit the size of the contributions he chooses to accept, 
he may decide to forgo private fundraising and accept public funding.” (emphasis added)); see also Ariz. 
Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2831 (“[A] public funding program must be voluntary to pass constitutional 
muster . . . .”); Gable v. Patton, 142 F.3d 940, 948 (6th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he central question . . . is 
whether the [t]rigger . . . rises to the level of constitutional coercion.”). 
 205. For a detailed discussion of cap gap provisions, including the states that have used them and the 
constitutional challenges that have been brought against them, see Li supra note 59, at 287–91. 
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to participate.206 Furthermore, by focusing entirely on the ability of 
the publicly funded candidate to raise funds and remain competitive, 
no burden is placed on the First Amendment rights of 
nonparticipating candidates. Prior to being amended in July of 2011, 
Rhode Island’s campaign finance system included a cap gap 
provision.207 Although decided before both Davis and Arizona Free 
Enterprise, the First Circuit upheld Rhode Island’s cap gap against a 
constitutional challenge in Vote Choice, Inc. v. DiStefano.208 
2. Multiplied Contribution Matching Provisions: The New York 
City Model 
As part of the Presidential Election Campaign Fund established in 
FECA (and upheld as constitutional in Buckley), the federal 
government matches up to $250 of an individual’s total contributions 
to an eligible candidate.209 Some states have campaign finance 
systems that provide similar contribution matching.210 In New York 
City’s campaign finance system, publicly funded candidates receive a 
six-to-one match for contributions up to $175.211 This type of 
multiplied contribution matching allows candidates to view public 
financing as a viable option when running against privately financed 
candidates who are able to self-fund. In the wake of Arizona Free 
Enterprise, some commentators have opined that the New York City 
                                                                                                                 
 206. One potential constitutional pitfall of cap gap provisions is that they create an asymmetrical 
regulatory scheme between participants and nonparticipants. Although the relaxed contribution limits in 
Davis were triggered by candidate spending, the Supreme Court did not approve of the resulting lack of 
contribution limit symmetry between candidates in the same race. Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 738 
(2008) (“We have never upheld the constitutionality of a law that imposes different contribution limits 
for candidates who are competing against each other . . . .”). 
 207. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-25-30(3) (2003) (amended 2011). 
 208. Vote Choice, Inc. v. DiStefano, 4 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 1993) (finding Rhode Island’s cap gap 
provision to be “narrowly tailored and logically related, in scope, size, and kind, to compelling 
governmental interests”). 
 209. 26 U.S.C. § 9034(a) (2006). For a brief summary of the public funding system for presidential 
elections created by FECA, see FINANCING THE 2008 ELECTION 9–11 (David B. Magleby & Anthony 
Corrado eds., 2011). 
 210. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 106.35(2) (2010). 
 211. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-705(2)(a) (West, Westlaw through Local Law 65 of 2010 and Chapters 
1–568 of the Laws of the State of New York for 2010). 
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system may become a model for the nation.212 There is even an effort 
underway at the federal level to implement a campaign finance 
program with a multiplied contribution matching provision.213 
3. Contribution Trigger Provisions 
While invalidating traditional trigger provisions, Arizona Free 
Enterprise said nothing about the constitutionality of provisions that 
are not triggered by an opponent’s spending, but by their ability to 
raise funds. These triggers, based on contributions and not 
expenditures, would seemingly avoid the constitutional problems 
discussed in Davis and Arizona Free Enterprise. In both of those 
cases, the Supreme Court made clear that a provision could not be 
triggered by expenditures because of First Amendment concerns.214 
If, however, the provision was triggered by an outside party making a 
contribution, it would be more likely to succeed because the analysis 
would not involve strict scrutiny.215 The distinction in Buckley 
between expenditures and contributions was based on the notion that 
contributions did not implicate the same type of speech as 
expenditures and therefore could be afforded the lower level of 
scrutiny.216 These contribution trigger provisions could be activated 
once a nonparticipating candidate reached a threshold level of 
contributions and could then provide the publicly financed candidate 
with simple matching funds or multiplied matching funds as in the 
New York City model. This approach would also aid in finding the 
                                                                                                                 
 212. See Alec Hamilton, Campaign Finance Ruling May Make NYC a Model for the Nation, 
WNYC.ORG (June 21, 2011), http://www.wnyc.org/articles/its-free-country/2011/jun/21/campaign-
finance-ruling-may-make-new-york-model-nation/; Richard L. Hasen, New York City as a Model?, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 27, 2011, 6:34 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/06/27/the-court-and-
the-future-of-public-financing/new-york-city-as-a-model-for-campaign-finance-laws. 
 213. Fair Elections Now Act, S. 750, 112th Cong. § 523 (2011). For more on the Fair Elections Now 
Act, see FAIR ELECTIONS NOW, http://fairelectionsnow.org/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2011).  
 214. See generally Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011) 
(invalidating a provision triggered by expenditures that resulted in matching funds); Davis v. FEC, 554 
U.S. 724 (2008) (invalidating a provision triggered by expenditures that resulted in asymmetrical 
contribution limits). 
 215. See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text. 
 216. See supra Part I.A. 
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“Goldilocks solution” that Justice Kagan discussed in her dissenting 
opinion in Arizona Free Enterprise by allowing governments to hold 
the funds until they were actually needed.217 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court established a framework in Buckley v. Valeo 
for challenges to campaign finance laws.218 Unfortunately, this 
framework did not provide specific guidance for courts in dealing 
with the trigger provisions that state and federal lawmakers began 
inserting into campaign finance legislation. Prior to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Free Enterprise 
PAC v. Bennett, a split emerged among the circuits in dealing with 
trigger provisions.219 In Arizona Free Enterprise, the Supreme Court 
held that trigger provisions burden the free speech of candidates and 
therefore unconstitutionally infringe on First Amendment rights.220 
With trigger provisions invalidated, state and federal lawmakers 
now have a clear directive regarding what not to insert in their 
campaign finance legislation. Even without the use of trigger 
provisions, there are still ample means of regulating campaign 
finance by implementing disclosure requirements, providing larger 
initial grants, and developing provisions that focus on 
contributions.221 Although attempting to ensure fair elections is a 
noble goal, the Supreme Court made it clear in Arizona Free 
Enterprise that the free discussion of public issues is at the core of 
the First Amendment and must be protected. 
 
                                                                                                                 
 217. Ariz. Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2832 (Kagan, J., dissenting). For more on the “Goldilocks” 
problem, see supra note 202. 
 218. See supra Part I.A. 
 219. See supra Part I.B–D. 
 220. See supra Part II.A. 
 221. See supra Part III. 
32
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 5
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol28/iss2/5
